information on the quality of some public sector services. Disclosure of schools'and teachers' quality is the case that has generated the biggest public debate. In the US, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) requires learning progress to be measured for every child and results from students'tests be made available in annual report cards, so that parents can evaluate schools' performances. Similar reforms have also been proposed for many other public services. In the UK, legislation introduced in the year 2000 now requires that the performance of each Local Government is reviewed and made public with regards to provision of services such as …re, police, housing, social services and education, but also like the condition of roads, the average time taken to remove ‡y-tips and the amount of household waste recycled.
distinguish themselves and o¤er information about their quality to the public. This may be puzzling, especially in light of the fact that some of the information is veri…able.
In this paper, we discuss one speci…c aspect of this problem: government services are typically not allocated through prices. We show that the absence of prices reduces (or potentially reverses) the incentives for the high quality providers to reveal themselves. Moreover, increasing the availability of information on quality leads to increased demand for the services of the high quality providers, and in some cases this might lead to rationing. Thus, our model highlights that the optimal disclosure of public services' quality has more delicate consequences than what many proponents simply envision. In particular, our analysis highlights that, in order to avoid perverse e¤ects of improved transparency, all such reforms must carefully consider how the allocation of services from best providers is a¤ected if the public becomes more informed about their identities.
We provide two simple models that starkly capture these considerations. In the most basic model (the Department of Motor Vehicle DMV model), several public o¢ ces that di¤er in e¢ ciency provide services to homogenous citizens. When e¢ ciency is exogenous, under no disclosure delays are lower in more e¢ cient o¢ ces, while under disclosure delays are equalized among all o¢ ces. Thus, citizens are better o¤ under the policy that disclose the e¢ ciency of the di¤erent o¢ ces. When e¢ ciency is endogenous, citizens might instead be better o¤ under the no disclosure policy, since the incentives to invest in e¢ ciency are lower when delays are revealed.
In the second model, the public o¢ ces have the features of the school system: schools di¤er in qualities, students di¤er in abilities and students'payo¤s exhibit complementarity between their ability and their school'quality. When each school has a …xed capacity and an oversubscribed school must allocate slots through lotteries, the allocation is more e¢ cient when information on school quality is not revealed. Moreover, again the incentives to invest in quality may be reduced by disclosure of information.
We believe the forces highlighted by our models do not apply to the public sector only, but more generally might shed some light to several instances in which prices do not fully adjust. For example, it is interesting to note that the theoretical literature on voluntary quality disclosure (Grossman (1981) and Jovanovic (1982) ) predicts that all high quality …rms should reveal their private information about quality. However, in contrast to this "unraveling" prediction, several empirical studies (Jin (2005) and Xiao (2006) ) have found that voluntary disclosure is incomplete in reality. This might seem puzzling at …rst sight, but if prices cannot fully adjust in response to quality di¤erences, our model suggests one reason for why such non-disclosure might persist in a market equilibrium.
Moreover, allocations are not driven by prices also within organizations, or in markets such as some health-care services, where insurers bargaining power e¤ectively limits the prices that doctors charge to their patients. Our analysis calls for further research to fully understand how provision of quality and disclosure of information interact in these contexts.
For instance, an extension of our analysis suggests that voluntary disclosure of high quality should be more prevalent for health specialties whose services are generally not covered by insurers and whose prices can thus adjust more rapidly to increases in demand, i.e. plastic surgeons more than pediatricians.
A Model of Delays in Public Services

Exogenous E¢ ciency
Consider an environment in which there several o¢ ces that provide a service. For concreteness, we will talk about the motor vehicle services. However, other examples in which waiting times are important considerations (various document o¢ ces, emergency rooms, ...) can also be sensibly though of this way.
Consumers dislike waiting but otherwise have homogeneous preferences across o¢ ces.
There is a mass M of consumers and there are N o¢ ces numbered 1; :::; N with M > N .
Workers in o¢ ce i can process each 'problem'in t i time units. Without loss of generality, we assume that t 1 < < t N : lower indexed o¢ ces are more e¢ cient. In order to get served, consumers must line up when the o¢ ce opens and the order of service is randomly determined. Thus, If M i consumers show up in o¢ ce i, the average waiting time for a consumer is
Absent any information about the e¢ ciency of the di¤erent o¢ ces, consumers are allocated randomly. Thus, each o¢ ce receives M N consumers and the average waiting time in o¢ ce i is
, and more e¢ cient o¢ ces have shorter waits. The average waiting time across all o¢ ces is then given by
Assume now that information about the e¢ ciency of the di¤erent o¢ ces is revealed to everyone. In equilibrium, waiting times must be equated across o¢ ces otherwise some consumers would prefer changing o¢ ce. Thus, M i must be such that
: We can thus conclude that
Since M j is decreasing in t j , more e¢ cient o¢ ces receive more consumers but all consumers wait the same amount in every o¢ ce. The average waiting time in every o¢ ce is given by
Proposition 1 (i) The number of visitors is increasing in the e¢ ciency of the locations when information about waiting times is public, while the number of visitors is independent of location when information is not revealed.
(ii) Average waiting times are shorter when information is revealed.
Proof. Part (i) is an immediate consequence of equation (2) and of the fact that allocations have to be independent of locations in the absence of any information. For part (ii), comparing equations (1) and (3), t D < t N D holds if and only if
. This is true since the left-hand is the harmonic mean of e¢ ciencies, while the right-hand side is the arithmetic mean of e¢ ciencies.
The intuition is straight-forward: when information is revealed the most e¢ cient o¢ ces process more consumers. Thus, average waiting times decrease.
In this model, the most e¢ cient o¢ ces receive more visitors when information about waiting times is public. Since there is no reward for processing more visitors, it is then plausible that preferences for disclosure of quality are inversely related to quality. The most e¢ cient o¢ ces are the most averse to disclosure.
Endogenous E¢ ciency
An important consequence of the model in which e¢ ciency is exogenous is that e¢ ciency is 'rewarded'when information is not public because the most e¢ cient employees on average work less. Instead, payo¤s for o¢ ce employees may be decreasing in e¢ ciency when information is disclosed. This perverse force might reduce the incentives to invest in e¢ ciency when e¢ ciency is endogenous, and lower investment might lead to overall higher waiting times when information in revealed.
To understand these e¤ects, consider now an extension of the previous model where, in a prior stage, each o¢ ce makes a decision that a¤ects its e¢ ciency. For instance, assume that in the second stage payo¤s for employees of o¢ ce i are given by T (t i x i ) M i , where T is the available time common to all o¢ ces, t i is the skill level of o¢ ce i absent any investment and x i 0 is the investment. The interpretation is that each employee enjoys free time left over after all customers are served. Assume that all employees within the same o¢ ce are identical and that, in the …rst stage, employees invest in choosing x i . Assume that the cost of investment is given by c (x; t i ) with @c @x > 0, i.e., investment is costly, and ; where > 0 is a parameter.
Thus, when information is not revealed, payo¤ from investment is
When information is revealed, by a simple modi…cation of equation (2), payo¤ is
When information is not revealed, the …rst order condition for
When information is revealed, the …rst order condition for
In many cases, the system of …rst order conditions (5) are not su¢ cient for a maximum of the payo¤ function. In particular, often the optimal x i is at the boundary, i.e. x i = 0.
In any case, it is clear that the incentives to invest in productivity are lower when waiting times are revealed. To illustrate the point, consider the following numeric example. Assuming N = 2; t 1 = 3; t 2 = 4; M = 10 and = 2; we obtain that when information is revealed the optimal x 1 and x 2 are interior and by equation (5) We can also compute waiting times in the two scenarios. When information is not revealed, we have that t 1 x 1 = 1:9 :833 and t 2 x 2 = 1:8 :625 ; so that average waiting time is
Under revelation, we have instead t 1 x 1 = 1:9 :635 and t 2 x 2 = 1:8 :182 ; so that average waiting time is
so that citizens are better o¤ when information about quality is not disclosed.
A Model of School Choice
Assume that there is a mass M of students and N schools numbered 1; :::; N . Students di¤er in ability a with distribution F . Schools di¤er in quality q with q 1 > ::: > q N . If a student of ability a attends a school of quality q, the outcome the student receives (wage, or opportunities) is given by a q
In contrast with the previous model, we assume that each school has a capacity. For simplicity we assume that capacity is the same for all schools and it is denoted by C. We assume that N C >> M but C << M so that no school can accommodate all the students but the school system is large enough so that all students can …nd at least one school. Schools are also di¤erentiated along an additional dimension that is perfectly observed by everyone (e.g., distance). For simplicity we also assume that this dimension is swamped by quality. In other words, if a student has no information on quality, he chooses based on distance. If he has information on quality, he chooses based on quality.
We assume that the environment in which information is not public is more complex than in the previous model. Speci…cally, we assume that the parents of each of the students receive a signal. With probability p (a) the signal reveals the quality of all the schools, with probability 1 p (a) the signal reveals nothing. We assume that p (a) is increasing so that parents of higher ability students are more likely to be informed about quality. We believe that this assumption is realistic and it is meant to represent the fact that parents who care more about education are both more likely to have high ability students and to acquire information both via word of mouth and because they are better able to process the information obtained via school visits and other informal ways of obtaining information.
Exogenous School Quality
We assume that everyone is allowed to apply to all schools. We need to specify what happens when a school is oversubscribed. Under both transparency regimes, we distinguish two scenarios. In the …rst scenario, oversubscribed schools run a lottery and the winners are o¤ered a slot. In the second scenario, each school runs a perfectly informative test and the higher ability applicants are o¤ered slots.
When information is not public, those who have information end up going to the highest quality school to which they are o¤ered a slot. Those who do not have information go to the closest school that o¤ers them a slot.
When information is public, all students go to the best school that o¤ers them a slot.
It is easy to see that in the transparent regime, if oversubscribed schools must allocate slots through lotteries, then the allocation is less e¢ cient than when information is not transparent. On the other hand, if schools can allocate slots through testing, then the most e¢ cient regime is the transparent regime.
We can therefore conclude that there are two dimensions of transparency in this model.
There is transparency of school quality and transparency of student quality. If oversubscribed schools must o¤er slots based on lotteries, this means that they cannot use information on ability. The most e¢ cient system is one in which there is two-sided transparency. The least e¢ cient system is one in which only school quality is transparent.
It is clear that, if principals care about the average quality of the students they receive, when slots are o¤ered through lotteries, principals of high-quality schools prefer the non transparent regime.
When school quality is endogenous, as in the model of delays, when slots are o¤ered through lotteries, the incentives to invest in school quality may very well be reduced by transparency. 
Related Literature
Concluding Remarks
We have presented two very stark models focusing on some aspects of transparency in bureaucracies. These show that transparency may have some potential perverse e¤ects unless accompanied by reforms of the incentives facing the bureaucrats.
